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Abstract 
While nudges are still mostly associated with affecting individual choices for their own long-
run interest, i.e. dealing with internalities, they are increasingly used in order to reduce 
externalities, such as environmental consequences. While we are gaining increasing insights 
into when and how nudges work, much less attention has been given to the normative aspects 
of nudging as a policy instrument to deal with externalities. We investigate optimal prosocial 
nudging under a number of different settings in a world where a conventional Pigovian tax can 
be used to a varying extent. We find that nudges typically only play a limited role when optimal 
taxes can be implemented. What we denote encouraging moral nudges, i.e. nudges where 
people’s choices are affected by strengthening consumers’ moral norms for doing the right 
thing, are more likely to play a role even when the tax is optimal compared to purely cognitive 
nudges. In addition, if a nudge better can target the right consumers, then it might also be 
optimal to use even when an optimal tax can be implemented. We also present decision rules 
for the optimal size of a nudge when an optimal tax cannot be implemented.  
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1. Introduction 
The conventional use of nudging (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) is in areas where individuals make 
poor decisions for themselves, including in areas such as savings decision (Madrian and Shea, 
2001; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004), health (Gine et al. 2008) and food choices (Dayan and Hillel, 
2011; Downs et al., 2009). However, we have seen an increased interest in nudging in areas 
where individuals make decisions that involve negative externalities, and where hence 
individuals might make bad decisions for the society. By prosocial nudging, we mean nudging 
intended to reduce negative externalities from consumption, rather than dealing with 
internalities in the sense that people are nudged to make better decision for themselves.  
 
A nudge is typically seen as a change in any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s 
behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their 
economic incentives (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). This is true also for prosocial nudges. 
However, while a well-functioning conventional nudge “creates large benefits for those who 
make errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational” (Camerer et al. 
2003, 1212), the purpose of prosocial nudges is not to correct for individual mistakes. Instead 
it is to use people’s cognitive and self-control limitations, as well as their moral convictions, in 
order to affect their behavior such that they will cause less negative externalities. Consequently, 
the rationale for nudging constitutes the fundamental difference between prosocial and 
conventional nudges.  
 
While we are gaining increasing knowledge on when and how such prosocial nudges work, in 
the sense that individual behavior is affected in the intended direction, much less attention has 
been put on prosocial nudging as a policy instrument compared to other policy instruments, 
from a welfare point of view. The present paper in contrast analyzes the socially optimal use of 
various kinds of prosocial nudging as well as trade-offs between standard policies, such as 
environmental taxes, and nudges. We will also analyze when conventional policy instruments 
and nudges are perfect substitutes, and whether they can complement each other. Such optimal 
prosocial nudging is then analyzed in a number of different settings.  
 
After a brief literature review on policy instruments with behavioral agents with a focus on 
prosocial nudging in Section 2, Section 3 outlines a simple model of prosocial nudging in an 
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economy with identical individuals and two goods, one clean and one dirty, and where there 
are no internalities. Two different kinds of costly nudges are introduced: cognitive and moral 
nudges. A cognitive nudge does not affect the utility function directly, but instead makes the 
dirty good to be perceived as less attractive relative to the clean one. A moral nudge, in contrast, 
affect the consumers’ moral utility, e.g. the nudge makes it morally costly to consumer the dirty 
good relative to the clean one. We analyse two versions of ta moral nudge: encouraging and 
discouraging moral nudges. People are either encouraged to do the right thing, or discouraged 
to do the wrong thing. An encouraging moral nudge induces additional utility from consuming 
the clean good, whereas discouraging moral nudges induce disutility from consuming the dirty 
good. The optimal provision rules for both types of nudges depend strongly on whether or not 
it is possible to use a conventional Pigovian tax on the dirty good. It is never optimal to use 
costly cognitive nudges or discouraging moral nudges together with an optimal Pigovian tax on 
the dirty good, whereas it can then still be optimal to use an encouraging moral nudge. 
 
In Section 4 we add initial biases with respect to the perceived price of the dirty good. We 
incorporate key features from the existing theoretical nudging literature focussing on 
internalities, such as Allcott et al. (2014), Allcott and Kessler (2015) and Farhi and Gabaix 
(2017), into the theory of optimal prosocial nudging. The optimal provision rules for the nudge 
then reflects both externalities and the initial biases, and they still critically depend on whether 
or not a conventional Pigovian taxes can be used.  
 
Section 5 incorporates the often observed empirical pattern that people’s prosociality, for 
example charitable contributions, has a relative dimension, such that people prefer to be more 
prosocial than others, ceteris paribus. Section 6 generalizes the model to the case of 
heterogeneous individuals, who differ with respect to income, initial bias and nudgeability (how 
much their choices are affected by a nudge). The model then naturally becomes more complex, 
but by assuming additively separable and quasi-linear preferences, we are able to obtain distinct 
and intuitive results that abstract from distributional and income effects in a convenient way. 
In addition to average externalities and measures of nudges and nudgeability it is demonstrated 
how various covariances become parts of the optimal policy rules. Section 7 provides some 
concluding remarks and suggests directions for future research. 
 
2. Literature on Prosocial Nudging 
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There is an increasing number of empirical studies investigating if various types of nudges 
affect individual behavior, and in turn environmental quality; Carlsson et el. (2018) provides a 
recent overview on nudges related to environmental issues. Prominent examples are default 
options for the choice of energy contract (e.g. Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2008), social norm 
messages to affect energy- and water use (e.g. Allcott, 2011; Ferraro et al., 2011), order effects 
for environmentally friendly food choices (Kurz, 2018), and changes in the physical 
environment to reduce food waste (Kallbekken and Saelen, 2013). Other empirical studies on 
prosocial nudging have investigated behavior such as organ donations (Johnson and Goldstein, 
2003), tax compliance (Hallsworth et al., 2017), and charitable giving (Shang and Croson, 
2009). 
 
The theoretical literature is much more limited, but there is a small literature on optimal 
environmental taxation when consumers suffer from some sort of internality, i.e. some kind of 
irrationality from the individual perspective (Allcott et al., 2014), or when there are moral 
concerns/altruism (Johansson, 1997). Allcott et al. (2014) present a model where consumers 
choose between an energy efficient and an inefficient durable good. They allow for 
misoptimizing agents that do not correctly value how energy efficiency will affect their future 
utility. This is modelled as a valuation weight function in the utility function. Energy use result 
in a constant marginal damage. There is thus both an internality and an externality. In their 
model there is set of different consumer types with different valuation weight functions. An 
optimal tax consists of two additive separable parts: the marginal damage of the externality and 
the average marginal internality. When the marginal internality is positive, the optimal tax will 
be higher than the marginal damage. They then allow for two instruments, a tax and a subsidy. 
The reasons for why a policy maker would consider both these instruments are that they can 
affect different consumers with different types of internalities and that they can be more or less 
efficient with respect to reducing the internality. They show that the magnitude of the optimal 
tax depends on how efficient it addresses the misoptimization relative to how efficient the 
subsidy is addressing the same misoptimization. In Tsvetanov and Segerson (2013) it is shown 
that a Pigovian tax is not sufficient to achieve a first-best outcome if consumers have self-
control problems. In their particular setting, consumers have to decide between durable-goods 
with different energy efficiency. Similarly, Heutel (2015) look at incentive-based policies and 
command-and-control policies addressing externalities when consumers are present biased. It 
is shown that a standard pigovian tax will never be optimal; instead, a tax, or a command-and-
control policy, would have to correct the present bias as well.  
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Moreover, there is an even smaller literature on optimal nudging. Allcott and Kessler (2015), 
and Farhi and Gabaix (2017) are the papers closest to the present one. In Allcott and Kessler 
(2015) there is a population of heterogeneous consumers, who choose the amount of a 
numeraire good and energy use. They allow for a difference between experienced utility and 
decision utility, so that there is potential behavioral bias. In addition, there is a moral utility 
term, which depends on energy use. Energy use also results in a negative externality. The policy 
maker can implement a nudge at a cost per consumer. Their model illustrates that the impact of 
a nudge on consumer and social welfare critically depend on how the nudge affects the 
consumer. A nudge that reduces the behavioral bias would be beneficial for the consumer and 
for society as well, if this reduce the extent of the externality, as would an encouraging nudge 
that increases the moral subsidy of low energy use be. On the other hand, a nudge that raises 
the moral cost of energy use would be bad for the consumer, but potentially good for society.  
 
Farhi and Gabaix (2017) focus on optimal taxation with behavioral agents, but also discuss 
optimal nudges. In a general setting where individuals maximize decision utility, given 
perceived prices, and where perceived prices can be changed with a costless nudge then the 
optimality condition for the tax is unchanged and the optimality condition for the nudge has 
four terms. The first is the effect on welfare due to reduced misoptimization, the second is direct 
effects of the nudge on utility. The third terms is the direct effect on tax revenue of changes in 
behavior, and the final terms capture indirect effects on tax revenue and welfare through the 
effect of the nudge on the externality. They also discuss another role of a nudge, which is if a 
tax has undesirable distributional effects. In particular, a nudge as opposed to a tax, allows for 
a correction of the internality without directly affecting the income of the individuals.  
 
3. Optimal Prosocial Nudging without Initial Biases 
We begin with a model where there are no internalities present for the individual. There are no 
misperceptions of prices, nor any differences between decision and experienced utility. This 
simple model will serve as a way to introduce the basic set-up, but also allows us to explore if 
a nudge should be used in such a setting as well. We assume that each of n identical individuals 
cares about own consumption of two goods, one clean good C and one dirty good D. The dirty 
good gives rise to a negative externality which depends on the total consumption of good D: 
( )E E nD . The government can use a consumption tax on the dirty good t, a lump-sum tax 
(subsidy), T, and a costly nudge Z. The production technology is linear and the production 
6 
 
prices of both goods are normalized to unity whereas the production price of the nudge is given 
by Q ; we will denote the average production price of the nudge by 
Q
q
n
 . The resource 
constraint is nY nC nD QZ    or Y C D qZ   , where Y is the exogenously given income 
level for each individual.  
 
Thus, we assume that there is a variable cost associated with a nudge, but not with a tax. This 
might not always be the case. There might be nudges that are more or less without any 
implementation costs and nudges that only have a fixed cost. The best example is perhaps 
default nudges, where either a default option is implemented, or the existing default option is 
redesigned. However, many other nudges would require non-neglible fixed costs and/or 
variables costs. Yet, we will also discuss cases when the marginal cost of the nudge is zero ( 
0q  ). 
 
We distinguish between cognitive nudges and moral nudges. A cognitive prosocial nudge uses 
a person’s bounded rationality or inattention to affect individual behavior. It includes aspects 
such as designing the default alternative, or affecting the salience of certain aspects of the choice 
architecture. A moral nudge, on the other hand, draws on people’s social preferences, their 
desire for status, to follow norms and to have positive self-image. 
 
3.1 Cognitive Nudges 
We model a cognitive nudge with an effect of the nudge on the perceived price of the dirty 
good. Consider a quasi-concave utility function, the same for each individual, given by: 
 ( , , )U u C D E , (1) 
where 0Cu  , 0Du   and 0Eu  . The nudge, Z, affects the perceived price of good D when 
making the consumption choice. Each individual maximizes utility subject to the perceived 
budget constraint, given by: 
 
(1 )
1 ( )
Y T
C D t Z
Z


   

, 
(2)  
instead of its actual budget constraint  
 (1 )Y T C D t    , (3)  
where 0  captures the nudgeability of the individual (cf. Gabaix and Farhi, 2017). We denote 
the perceived (relative) price of good D, (1 t Z  ), by P , the derivative of the demand with 
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respect to the perceived price by pD , and the derivative of the demand with respect to the nudge 
by ZD , where Z PD D . Thus, we assume that the nudge can increase the perceived relative 
price of the dirty good. ( )Z  then simply reflects the correspondingly changed budget, in order 
for both the perceived and actual budget to hold simultaneously. For (2) and (3) to hold 
simultaneously we have that ( ) 0
(1 )
D
Z Z
C D t Z


  
  
, where we thus assume that the 
individual will perceive income as exogenous. 
 
Throughout the paper, we will let a cognitive nudge affect the perceived price. Of course, we 
do not believe that all cognitive nudges affect the perceived prices; this is instead used as a 
simple way to let the nudges affect the choices made without directly affecting utility. Another 
way to model what we denote a cognitive nudge is to distinguish between decision and 
experienced utility (Farhi and Gabaix, 2017), where decision utility but not experienced utility 
would be affected by the nudge. The results would be very similar with such an approach. This 
type of model is also similar to how inattention to prices (see e.g. Chetty, 2015; Allcott and 
Taubinsky, 2015) and product attributes (see e.g. Bordalo et al., 2013) is typically modeled. 
 
Given these assumptions, we can state our first proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. With an optimal tax, and where the individuals initially do not suffer from any 
biases there is no role for a cognitive nudge. The optimal tax on the dirty good is the 
conventional Pigovian tax: 
 '( )Pigou ECt t nMRS E nD   . 
 
The intuition is straightforward. If there are two ways to affect the perceived price, and where 
the marginal cost of affecting the price is zero for one - the tax - and possibly positive for the 
other - the nudge - then it can never be welfare improving to use a nudge. Yet, if the nudge is 
free of costs as well, then it would be equally optimal to use a nudge instead of the tax. 
 
If the tax is not set at the optimal level then it would, under most circumstances, be optimal to 
use a nudge. Naturally, we will focus our interpretation of the results on the situation when the 
tax is set lower than the optimal tax, but all results hold for both cases. The individual is still 
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making the same maximisation problem as above, but with the difference that the tax is not 
optimal. We then have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2. With a tax on good D that is not optimal, and where individuals initially do not 
suffer from any bias, a cognitive nudge will be optimal under special conditions. We have that: 
i) For 0Z  , the optimal nudge is given by:  
Pigou
Z
q
t t
D
Z

 
 , else Z = 0. 
ii) For any level of the cognitive nudge the optimal level of the tax is given by: 
 Pigout t Z  . 
 
The optimal level of the nudge in the case of no tax and no cost of providing the nudge is 
 Pigout
Z

 . 
(4) 
The optimal level of the nudge is the marginal damage divided by the nudgeability parameter. 
The intuition is straightforward. Let us take the optimal tax first. The purpose of the optimal 
tax is to change the relative prices of the two goods so that the externality is internalized. 
Consider next a nudge without any tax and with no implementation costs. The optimal amount 
of a nudge would then be such that the perceived relative price between the dirty and the clean 
good would exactly mimic the actual relative price that a Pigovian tax would induce. From the 
individual perceived budget restriction (2) we see that a nudge such that 
PigouZ t  would 
change the perceived relative price equally much as a Pigovian tax would.  
 
Similarly, in the case where a tax has internalized, say, 40% of the externality, and where there 
is still no costs associated with nudging per se, it follows that an optimal nudge would be given 
as 
0.4
0.6
Pigou Pigou Pigou Pigout t t t t
Z
  
 
   . Thus, an optimal nudge should then be such that 
it would cause an equally large relative price change as a tax that would internalize the 
remaining part of the externality would.  
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When we introduce a positive cost of nudging, it naturally becomes less attractive to nudge. 
The optimal level of nudging will now decrease with the price of the nudge in relation to how 
effective the nudge is in affecting the perceived price. 
 
In our framework, proposition 2 implies that it is optimal to have a cognitive nudge at all if and 
only if 
Pigou
Z
q
t t
D
   .1 Thus, because of the cost of providing the nudge, the optimal nudge 
will be smaller than the difference between the optimal tax and the actual tax scaled by the 
nudgeability parameter. The left hand side of this expression is increasing in the marginal cost 
of the nudge, q , and decreasing in the effectiveness of the nudge, ND . The optimal level of the 
nudge is higher the lower the tax is, and higher the lower  is. A lower   means that individuals 
are less affected by the nudge, and thus to achieve a given effect on behavior the nudge has to 
be stronger 
 
3.2 Moral Nudges 
So far, we have assumed that there are no direct effects on experienced utility of a nudge, 
beyond those effects caused by the changes in consumption choices. However, many nudges 
aim at affecting the experienced utility directly; in particular nudges that relate to norms. It 
could for example be nudges that gives information about norms or strengthen the impact of 
the norms. We will here assume that the nudge only affects a norm, which in turn will affect 
experienced utility, and hence decision utility, but not the perceived price. Following Levitt and 
List (2007) we let individuals care about perceived own morality, M, in addition to own 
consumption of the two goods and the externality: 
 ( , , , )U u C D E M , (5) 
where 0Cu  , 0Du  , 0Eu   and 0Mu   and where u is strictly quasi-concave and twice 
continuously differentiable. The perceived own morality is monotonically decreasing in own 
consumption of the dirty good D, and the strength of this norm is influenced by the nudge Z, 
such that: ( , )M M D Z . Each individual maximizes utility subject to the actual budget 
constraint, given by: 
 (1 )Y T C D t    . (6) 
                                                          
1 Note that we have modelled the costs of nudging in a very simple way. If we would introduce fixed costs of 
nudging, the conditions for when it is optimal to nudge would naturally be more stringent. 
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We can think of different broad types of moral nudges, intended to reduce consumption of the 
dirty good D. One is an Encouraging moral nudge, which encourage people to do the right 
thing, i.e. consume less of the dirty good. Introducing or increasing such a nudge would mean 
that people get more utility ceteris paribus, i.e. for any given behaviour, such that 0ZM 
(recall that people’s utility increases in M). In addition, an encouraging moral nudge may reduce 
the consumption of the dirty good since the benefit of behaving in an appropriate manner is 
even larger. Another type of nudge is a Discouraging moral nudge, which discourage people 
from doing the wrong thing, which here means to discourage them from consuming the dirty 
good. Introducing or increasing such a nudge would mean that people get less utility ceteris 
paribus, i.e. for a given behaviour, such that 0ZM  . In addition, a discouraging nudge may 
reduce the consumption of the dirty good since the cost of not behaving in the appropriate way 
has increased.  
 
Another way to think about this is to think about one moral nudge but distinguish between 
different individuals with different levels of consumption of the dirty good. In particular, 
consider the following additively separable formulation: 
 ˆ( , , , ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( ) ( )U u C D E M f C D E M f C D E g Z h D D       (7) 
where ( ) 0g Z  , ( ) 0h D  , '( ) 0g Z  , '( ) 0h D   and where Dˆ  denotes the reference 
consumption level; moral utility is thus given by ˆ( ) ( )g Z h D D . First, assume that Dˆ D , 
where e.g. Dˆ  is the amount of the dirty good that the individual would have consumed without 
any morality. Here clearly people receive a positive utility effect, or an increased warm-glow 
effect, from an increased nudge without considering any consumption adjustment due to the 
nudge so ˆ'( ) ( ) 0ZM g Z h D D   , thus the nudge would be an encouraging nudge. Consider 
next a discouraging nudge, which can be illustrated with the same functional form but where 
now instead Dˆ D , where a special case is that ˆ 0D   so that people simply receive a negative 
utility effect due to their consumption of the dirty good. Here '( ) ( ) 0ZM g Z h D   , i.e. the 
moral utility will decrease with an increased nudge ceteris paribus.  
 
This functional form also points to a third case which is where in equilibrium Dˆ D . This 
means that 0ZM  , such that utility on the margin is independent of the nudge, ceteris paribus. 
We will denote this case as a Hedonically neutral moral nudge. An increase of a hedonically 
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neutral moral nudge will neither make you feel better or worse about yourself than before, but 
it would make the moral issues more salient such that you would still buy less of the dirty good.  
 
Despite the differences between cases, an increasing nudge will for each of these cases imply 
that the value of the dirty good for the consumers, as measured by the marginal rate of 
substitution between the dirty good and the clean good, will decrease with the nudge ceteris 
paribus. Indeed, it will decrease in exactly the same way in each of the cases, as follows  
  
,
( ) '
'
'( ) 0
D
CDC
C D C
f g Z h
fMRS h
g Z
Z Z f
 
 
       
  
              (8) 
 
For the optimal policy, it turns out to be important to distinguish between encouraging, 
discouraging and hedonically neutral moral nudges, as can be observed in the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 3. With an optimal tax, and where the individuals initially do not suffer from any 
biases, 
i) then for an encouraging moral nudge ( 0ZM  ) an interior solution of the optimal moral 
nudge is given by: 
MC ZMRS M q , else 0Z  .  
ii) It is not optimal to provide a discouraging or hedonically neutral moral nudge ( 0ZM  ). 
iii) The optimal tax on the dirty good is the Pigovian tax: Pigout t . 
 
Thus, a moral nudge should only be used if it directly increases perceived moral utility, i.e. only 
encouraging nudges should potentially be used. Furthermore, the only role of the nudge is to 
directly affect moral utility, since the tax can deal with the externality per se. The nudge would 
thus function as a way of rewarding individuals that are doing something good, and the marginal 
utility of this reward should be equal to the marginal cost of the nudge. Do note, however, that 
the level of the tax with moral utility could be different from the level of the tax without moral 
utility, and the level of the optimal tax could vary with the level of the nudge as well.  
 
Again, we next consider the optimal moral nudge when the tax for whatever reason is not 
optimal:  
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Proposition 4. With a tax on D that is not optimal, and where the individuals initially do not 
suffer from any bias, then 
i) For Z > 0, the optimal moral nudge is given by:  
Pigou Z
MC
Z Z
Mq
t t MRS
D D
    , else 0Z   
ii) For any level of the moral nudge the optimal level of the tax is given by: 
'( ) PigouECt nMRS E nD t   . 
 
For simplicity, let us first set the tax on the dirty good to zero. For Z > 0, the optimal level of 
the nudge is then given by: 
 Pigou
MC Z Zq MRS M t D  . 
() 
The left-hand-side of the expression for the optimal level of the nudge is the marginal cost of 
the nudge. The first term on the right-hand-side reflects the monetary value of the direct effect 
of the nudge on utility through effects on perceived morality (for a given consumption of the 
dirty good). The second term on the right-hand-side side reflects the marginal damage of the 
externality and the effectiveness of the moral nudge on the demand of the dirty good.  
 
If the moral nudge on the margin is hedonically neutral ( 0ZM  ), then the first term on the 
left-hand-side is zero. The optimal level of the nudge depends only on the marginal damage, 
the effectiveness of the nudge in terms of affecting the consumption of the dirty good and the 
marginal cost of the moral nudge. If the nudge is encouraging ( 0ZM  ), then there is an 
additional welfare enhancing effect of the nudge, which implies, ceteris paribus, a higher level 
of the nudge compared with a hedonically neutral nudge. If the nudge is discouraging ( 0ZM 
), then there is welfare reducing effect of the nudge in terms of moral utility and a welfare 
enhancing effect in terms of reduced level of the externality. This parallels the analysis in 
Allcott and Kessler (2015), who analyse an optimal nudge where there is both an internality 
and a moral utility, and show that the effect on the consumer (and the size of the nudge) 
critically depends on if the nudge increases or decreases moral utility. This also means that if 
the negative effect on moral utility of a discouraging nudge is sufficiently large, the optimal 
level of the moral nudge is zero. 
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 It is important to point out that the above discussion rests on the assumption that the effect on 
the demand of the dirty good is similar for a nudge that affects guilt as for a nudge that has a 
positive effect on utility. The literature on norm messages related to water and energy use 
provides some empirical evidence about the plausibility of this assumption (see e.g. Allcott, 
2011; Ferraro and Price, 2013). With these norm messages, low users receive a positive 
feedback on their use, while the high users receive a negative feedback on their use. This would 
suggest that the effect could be stronger for those receiving a negative effect on moral utility. 
However, it could also be that there is simply more room to improve for high users, or that they 
actually obtain a positive moral utility from the actual improvement in behaviour. The latter is 
not how we have modelled the effect on moral utility though. 
 
Another interesting question is how to view moral utility from a social welfare perspective. So 
far, we have assumed that social planner considers moral utility when setting the optimal tax 
and nudge. As we saw, this results, among other things, that it is optimal for the government to 
implement encouraging moral nudges even with an optimal tax because of a resulting in 
increase in moral utility. One might argue that this type of welfare effects should not be taken 
into consideration when designing the policies, although one could still rely on the mechanism 
that the moral nudge provides. The condition for the optimal level of the nudge is then actually 
equivalent to the case of a hedonically neutral nudge.   
 
4. Optimal Prosocial Nudging with an Initial Bias 
So far we have assumed that individuals have no behavioral biases, and found that the role of 
nudges is rather limited. The traditional role of nudges is when there are behavioral biases, and 
the question is of course if the presence of a negative externality affects the role of a nudge. As 
before we assume that the government can use a consumption tax on the dirty good t, a lump-
sum tax (or subsidy if negative), and a costly nudge Z in order to affect the perceived price by 
the consumer when making the consumption choice. In addition, we assume the consumer faces 
an initial bias, b, of the perception of the price of the dirty good, D. This bias can be either 
positive or negative. We will primarily focus on the case where there is an underestimation of 
the real price. It could for example be inattention to the price or certain aspects of the price 
(Allcott, 2013; Tanjim and Morgan, 2006; Chetty et al. 2009), or biased beliefs (Allcott, 2013, 
Allcott and Wozny, 2014). It is important to point out that there is nothing inherent in that there 
would be a bias in the perception of the price of dirty goods only, and not on the price of clean 
goods. However, we will restrict our attention to this case. 
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4.1 Cognitive Nudge 
Let us again begin with the case where there is no moral utility, and the nudge affects the 
perceived price of the dirty good. Each individual maximize utility subject to the perceived 
budget constraint, given by: 
 
(1 )
1 ( )
Y T
C D t b Z
Z


    

, 
(9) 
where b reflects the initial bias of the perceived price on the dirty good D. We assume that the 
nudge will increase the perceived relative price of the dirty good, while ( )Z  reflects the 
correspondingly changed budget such that the perceived and actual - still given by (3) - budget 
constraints hold simultaneously, implying that ( ) ( )
(1 )
D
Z Z b
C D t b Z


  
   
. The 
production technology and the resource constraint are the same as before. Given that the 
individuals maximises the utility function in (1), and the above perceived budget constraint we 
have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 5. With an initial behavioural bias, and a costly cognitive nudge we have that: 
i) If the tax is optimal there is no role for a cognitive nudge: The optimal tax on the 
dirty good is given by a modified Pigovian tax: '( ) PigouECt b nMRS E nD b t    . 
ii) If the tax is not optimal then the optimal cognitive nudge is given by: 
Pigou
Z
q
b t t
D
Z

  
  
iii) For any level of the cognitive nudge the optimal tax is given by: 
Pigout t b Z    
 
The optimal tax is similar to what Farhi and Gabaix (2017) derive: the optimal Pigovian tax is 
modified by a term due to a behavioural bias such as a misperception of prices. The larger the 
initial bias is, the larger the correction of the original level of the Pigovian tax needs to be. 
Again, we find that if an optimal tax can be implemented, there is no role for a nudge, despite 
a behavioural bias. Do note that we have assumed that individuals perceive the tax without bias. 
If the individual would only perceive a fraction of the tax, then the optimal tax would have to 
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be corrected due to this as well (Farhi and Gabaix, 2017). However, it would not change the 
conclusion that the tax is preferred.  
 
Without a tax and with zero cost of providing the nudge, the condition for the optimal level of 
the nudge simplifies to: 
 Pigoub t
Z


 . 
(10) 
The expression for the optimal nudge with a non-optimal tax is similar to the expression derived 
without a behavioural bias (proposition 2). The difference is that the optimal nudge also 
depends on the initial bias. For the case when 0b  , i.e. that the consumer initially does not 
perceive the true price of the dirty good, it is more likely that it is optimal to use a nudge. 
Furthermore, the level of the nudge is increasing in the absolute magnitude of this initial bias.  
 
4.2 Moral Nudge 
Next, we reconsider the case of a moral nudge when allowing for an initial bias as well. We 
then have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 6. With an initial behavioural bias, and a costly moral nudge we have that: 
i) If the tax is optimal, an interior solution of optimal moral nudging is given by the 
same choice rule as without initial behavioural biases (proposition 3). The optimal 
tax on the dirty good is given by the same modified Pigovian tax as for the case 
where nudging does not affect experienced utility directly (proposition 3). 
ii) If the tax is not optimal then, for 0Z  , the optimal moral nudge is given by: 
Pigou Z
MC
Z Z
Mq
t t b MRS
D D
      else 0Z  . 
iii) For any level of the nudge, the optimal tax is given by 
Pigout t b  . 
 
These results follows naturally from the discussion around propositions 3 and 5. Again, the 
optimal nudge, when the tax is not optimal, depends on the sign and size of the initial 
behavioural bias. With 0b  , a higher bias would imply a higher level of the nudge. The direct 
effect on moral utility is of course still relevant as well. With 0ZM   the level of the nudge 
would tend to be higher, since there is a direct positive effect on moral utility of the nudge. The 
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expression of the optimal level of the tax for a given level of the nudge is the same as the 
expression for the optimal tax, but the level of the tax is likely to be different.  
 
5. Optimal Prosocial Moral Nudging with Social Status 
We now consider a model with moral nudges and social status concerns. People care about 
absolute consumption as well as relative consumption of both goods, such that they prefer to 
consume more than others, ceteris paribus. In addition, they care about morality, which in turn 
depends on their own absolute as well as relative consumption of the dirty good, as well as the 
moral nudge (which can here too be either encouraging or discouraging). While the extension 
of social comparisons naturally makes the model more complex, it is realistic both with respect 
to consumption or income (e.g. Johansson-Stenman et al. 2002, Alpizar et al. 2005, Clark et al. 
2008) and prosociality such as giving to charity (e.g. Glazer and Konrad, 1996; Harbaugh, 
1998a,b). Thus, we will model a case where the individual has positional concerns for both the 
clean good, C, and the dirty good, D, and where relative consumption of D matters for morality, 
as follows:  
 ( , , , , , ( , , ))U u C C C D D D E M D D D Z    , (11) 
where a bar denotes the population average of the variable. The assumption that status depends 
on the average is of course a simplification, but an innocuous one here when people are 
identical. Following for example Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008), define the degree 
of positionality of good C as: 
 
C C C
C C C
u
u u
 



. 
(12) 
We can interpret C as representing the fraction of the overall utility increase from the last 
dollar spent on C that is due to the increased relative consumption. 0C   represents the 
conventional case where only absolute consumption matters, whereas 1C   represents the 
case where, on the margin, only relative consumption of C matters to the individual. Let D  
denote the corresponding degree of positionality for good D; for simplicity we assume the same 
degree of positionality for the two goods: C D    . We define the degree of moral 
positionality as: 
 
D D
D D D
M
M M
 



. 
(13) 
The interpretation is similar as for the consumption of the two goods:   represents the fraction 
of the overall moral utility increase from the last dollar reduction spent on the dirty good D that 
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is due to an improved relative consumption of D. 0   represents the case where morality 
only depends on own absolute consumption of the dirty good D, whereas 1   represents the 
case where only relative consumption of the dirty good D matters for morality. 
 
Before presenting the results, let us consider two different definitions of the marginal rate of 
substitution, depending on whether the consumption and morality of others are held fixed or 
not. These two definitions will be important for the interpretation of the results regarding the 
optimal levels of the nudge and the tax. The conventional marginal rate of substitution between 
environmental quality and private consumption ceteris paribus, i.e. holding everything else in 
the model fixed, including the consumption of others, is: 
 
E
EC
C C C
u
MRS
u u



, 
(14) 
Analogous to the definition in Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008) for public goods, let 
us next define 
 
E
EC
C
u
CMRS
u
 . 
(15) 
as the marginal rate of substitution between environmental quality and private consumption 
when consumption is changed equally much for all individuals in society. Correspondingly, let 
us define: 
 
M
MC
C C C
u
MRS
u u



 , and 
(16) 
 
 
M
MC
C
u
CMRS
u
 . 
(17) 
 
If individuals maximises the utility function in (11) under the budget constraint
(1 )Y T C D t    , we have the following proposition regarding optimal nudging. 
 
Proposition 7. With status concerns and an optimal tax,  
i) an interior solution of an optimal encouraging moral nudge ( 0ZM  ), is given by  
 
1
MC Z
MC Z
MRS M
q CMRS M

 

. 
ii) It is never optimal to provide a discouraging moral nudge ( 0ZM  ). 
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iv) The optimal tax on the dirty good is: 
1
PigouC
MC Dt t CMRS M
 


 

, 
or 
1 (1 )(1 )
Pigou
MC D
t
t MRS M
 
  

 
  
 
 
The conditions for the optimal level of the nudge can be expressed in almost the same way as 
in the model with moral concerns without status concerns: the marginal cost of the nudge should 
be equal to the marginal benefit of the nudge in terms of improved moral utility, where the only 
difference is that MCMRS is replaced by MCCMRS . The latter measures the individual marginal 
willingness to pay for improved morality when all individuals in the economy will have to pay 
for the moral improvement. As such, it can be seen as a collective decision regarding how much 
people would be willing to pay for improved morality if all people would make the choice 
together. Note that MCCMRS  in principle reflects the marginal willingness to pay measures that 
would be revealed based on a so-called referendum approach in the stated preference literature, 
i.e. an approach where people are asked to vote yes or no to a hypothetical referendum for a 
certain (e.g. environmental) improvement where all citizens would have to pay for the 
improvement. MCMRS , in contrast, reflects how much an individual would be willing to pay 
for the moral improvement in isolation. Such a marginal payment would have three utility 
consequences for the individual: increased morality and decreased consumption, and improved 
relative consumption (since the consumption of others would not decrease here); therefore 
MC MCMRS CMRS . For this reason, MCMRS  would also reflect a desire not to fall behind the 
other individuals in terms of consumption. To correct for the latter effect, or rather the 
externalities associated with the fact that the individuals take such in the optimal choice rule 
MCMRS is divided by 1  . 
 
However, the expression for the optimal tax is different from the case with moral utility without 
status concerns. The reason is that the concern for status generates an additional externality. 
Whether the optimal tax is lower or higher than the standard Pigovian tax depends on a number 
of factors. First, the standard term should be scaled because of the concern for status in the 
consumption goods,  , similar as for the optimal nudge rule. In the first expression for the 
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optimal tax we denote the corresponding Pigovian tax by 
PigouCt ; this is thus equal to 
1
Pigout

. 
Second, if the marginal degree positionality is stronger for the moral good,   , than for the 
consumption goods,  , then the optimal tax is also smaller than the standard Pigvovian tax, 
since 0DM  . Thus, if the concern for status in the moral utility is sufficiently strong, then the 
optimal tax will be reduced. 
 
The conditions for the optimal level of a nudge if a tax is not set at the optimal level is given in 
Proposition 8. 
 
Proposition 8. With status concerns and a non-optimal tax, an interior solution of the optimal 
moral nudge is given by: 
 ( )
Pigou Z
MC D MC
Z Z
Mq
t t CMRS M CMRS
D D
        
For any level of the nudge, the optimal tax is still given by the same choice rule in proposition 
7. 
 
The condition for the optimal level of the nudge is now different from a model without social 
status; the reason is the same as for the optimal tax, the concern for status imply additional 
externalities that would need to be taken into consideration for the optimal level of the nudge.  
  
6. Generalization to a Heterogeneous Population 
We will now generalize our analysis to a setting with heterogeneous individuals. We consider 
the same models as before, where the government can use a consumption tax, t, on the dirty 
good, individual-specific lump-sum taxes (or subsidies if negative), and a costly nudge Z. 
 
6.1 Cognitive nudge 
Again, the cognitive nudge affects the perceived price by the consumer when making the 
consumption choices. We assume the following utility function: 
 ( , )i i iU C g D E  , (18) 
where 0Dg   and 0Eg   ; g is strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable in D and 
E. The additive separability and quasi-linearity assumptions are made for analytical simplicity, 
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and in order to be able to abstract from distributional and income effects in a convenient way. 
Each individual maximizes utility subject to the perceived budget constraint, given by: 
 
(1 )
1 ( )
i i
i i i i
i
Y T
C D t b Z
Z


    

. 
(19) 
For this to hold simultaneously with each individual’s actual budget constraint, given by
(1 )i i i iY T C D t     we have that ( ) ( )
(1 )
i
i i i
i i i i
D
Z Z b
C D t b Z


  
   
. Note that we 
allow for heterogeneity in the initial bias and nudgeability as well. We will use the following 
short notations for the normalized covariances: , cov ,p
p
D
p
D
D




 
  
 
 
, , cov ,p
p
b D
p
Db
b D

 
  
 
 
,
, cov ,Z
Z
D
Z
D
D




 
  
 
, and , cov ,Z
Z
b D
Z
Db
b D

 
  
 
. Note that these are the normalized covariances, 
which will have implications for the sign of the covariance. For example, if , 0pD  , then 
individuals with a high nudgeability also have a demand of the dirty good that is more sensitive 
to a change in perceived price. 
 
The externality is given by: 
  1( ... )n iiE E D D E D     . 
(20) 
The production technology is still linear and the same as the one with identical individuals; 
although the individuals and their income and consumption now differ. Hence: 
 
1 1
n ni i i
i i
Y C D QZ
 
    . (21) 
The government can finance the nudge by individual-specific lump-sum taxes as well as a tax 
on the dirty good (the same tax rate for all), such that each individual faces the actual budget 
constraint: 
 (1 )i i i iY T C t D    . (22) 
The aim of the government is to choose the tax level, t, the nudge, Z and the individual lump-
sum taxes/transfers, to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function: 
 
1
n i
i
W U

 . (23) 
We then have the following proposition regarding the optimal nudge and tax: 
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Proposition 9. With a heterogeneous population with respect to initial bias and nudgeability, 
and an optimal tax, then: 
i) There may be a role for a cognitive nudge. For Z > 0 the optimal level of the 
cognitive nudge is:  
 , ,
, ,( )
Z p
Z p
b D b D
Z
D D
q
b
D
N
 
 
  
 


 
ii) The optimal tax is given by: 
   , , ,, ,
, , , ,
1
( 1 1 )
Z p p
p p
Z p Z p
b D b D DPigou
b D D
D D D DZ
q
t t b
D


   
  
 
   
 
     
 
 if Z > 0 
 ,( 1 pPigou b Dt t b     if Z = 0 
 
Once we introduce heterogeneity, there are some instances when a nudge is socially optimally 
even when an optimal tax can be implemented. Before proceeding, do note that a nudge would 
only be optimal under a number of conditions. Apart from that the cost of the nudge cannot be 
too high relative to the extent of the bias and the nudgeability, there are also some conditions 
on the covariance terms.2 In order to facilitate interpretation let us begin with a more restrictive 
case. Let us assume that the two covariance terms, , pb D  and , pD , are zero. This means that the 
distribution of the initial bias and the nudgeability is completely independent of the distribution 
of the price sensitivity of the dirty good. In other words, the effect of the tax on individuals 
demand is completely uncorrelated with the initial bias or the nudgeability. In that case, the 
condition for the optimal nudge reduces to: 
 
   , ,
, var( )
Z Z
Z
b D b D
Z Z
D
q q
b b
D D
N

 
  
 
  . 
(24) 
Let us focus on the case where 0b  , i.e. the average bias is an underestimation of the price of 
the dirty good. A nudge would only be optimal iff  , 0Zb D
Z
q
b
D
  . Given that it is optimal 
to use a nudge, the level of the nudge would be increasing in the extent of the bias, b , and 
decreasing in the nudgeability,  . The term , Zb D  is the normalized covariance between the 
                                                          
2 Either   , , 0Z pb D b D    and , ,( ) 0Z pD D    , or  , , 0Z pb D b D    and , ,( )Z pD D   . 
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initial bias and the responsiveness of the demand of the dirty good to the nudge. A positive 
covariance means that subjects with a high initial bias are more responsive to the nudge. Thus 
with a positive covariance, it will be more beneficial for society to use a nudge compared with 
a tax. Think of an extreme situation where only some individuals underestimate the price of the 
dirty good. An optimal tax would then be adjusted upwards for all individuals based on the 
average underestimation. Now, if those that underestimate the price are highly nudgeable while 
others are not affected by the nudge, then a nudge might be preferred over a tax because it 
would better target individuals with a biased perception. Finally, a higher variance in 
nudgeability implies a lower level of the optimal nudge. With a higher variance, there is an 
additional cost of a nudge in terms of the absence of an effect compared with a tax. 
 
Let us now return to the more general case in proposition 9. In the numerator, we then also have 
the normalized covariance between the bias and the price sensitivity of the demand of the dirty 
good. A positive covariance means that individuals with a high bias are more sensitive to 
changes in the price of the good (and hence the tax), and therefore the optimal level of the nudge 
will be lower with a positive covariance. In the denominator, we have two covariance terms for 
nudgeability. If 
, ZD
  is positive, then the nudge is effective for those that are nudgeable. This 
implies that the nudge does not have to be that large to obtain a given effect. If , pD  is positive 
this means that those that are nudgeable are also more responsive to the price, and therefore the 
level of the nudge will be higher. 
 
Let us now look at the case with a non-optimal tax: 
 
Proposition 10. With a heterogeneous population and a non-optimal tax then: 
 
i) The optimal level of the cognitive nudge is given by  
 
 
,
,
1
1
Z
Z
Pigou
b D
Z
D
q
t t b
D
Z


 
   


 
  
ii) The optimal tax on the dirty good for a given level of the nudge is given by: 
   , ,1 1p pPigou b D Dt t b Z         
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The optimal level of the nudge without a tax and with no cost of providing the nudge simplifies 
to 
  
 
,
,
1
1
Z
Z
Pigou
b D
D
t b
Z


 
 


. 
(25) 
The level of the nudge is increasing in b  (with a high average initial bias the nudge would have 
to be larger) and decreasing in   (if the nudge on average is effective then the nudge does not 
have to be that large). Furthermore, if the covariance term, 
, Zb D
  is positive, this means that 
those with a high initial bias are more responsive to the nudge, and therefore the level of the 
nudge will be higher ceteris paribus. Finally, if the covariance term 
, ZD
  is positive, those that 
are nudgeable are also more responsive to the nudge, which means that the level of the nudge 
will be smaller. 
 
6.2 Moral nudge 
Extending the case of a moral nudge with heterogeneity, we assume the following utility 
function: 
 ( , , )i i i i iU C g D E M  . (26) 
If individuals maximise this utility function subject to the same perceived budget constraint as 
before, we then have the following proposition regarding the optimal nudge and tax. 
 
Proposition 11. Consider a model with a heterogeneous population and initial behavioural 
biases in a model where nudging affects a moral norm, and where externalities can be taxed 
optimally. Then: 
i) For Z > 0, the optimal level of the nudge is given by the condition 
  , ,Z p MC Zb D b D
Z Z
MRS Mq
b
D D
      
ii) The optimal tax on the dirty good is given by 
 ,1 pPigou b Dt t b     
 
As before, the optimal level of the nudge is decreasing in the marginal cost of the nudge, and 
the moral nudge should only be used there is a positive effect on moral utility of the nudge (an 
encouraging nudge). Moreover it will depend on the extent of the bias and the two normalized 
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covariance terms 
, Zb D
 and , pb D . The level of the nudge will be higher if there is a positive 
covariance between the initial bias and the responsiveness of the demand of the dirty good to 
the nudge, and lower if there is a positive covariance between the initial bias and the 
responsiveness of the demand of the dirty good with respect to changes in price. 
 
Similarly, we have the condition for the optimal level of the nudge when the tax is not optimal. 
 
Proposition 12. Consider a model with a heterogeneous population and initial behavioural 
biases in a model where nudging affects a moral norm, and where the tax is not optimal then: 
i) The optimal level of the nudge is given by the condition  
  ,1 Z
Pigou MC Z
b D
Z Z
MRS Mq
t t b
D D
       
ii) The optimal tax on the dirty good when nudging is not optimal is given by 
 ,1 pPigou b Dt t b     
 
These expressions are similar to the ones we have seen without moral utility, the difference is 
of course the additional term on the right hand side for the optimal level of the nudge. This 
term, in turn, is the same as in the homogenous case in proposition 6. 
 
6.3 Moral nudge when there is status concerns 
Finally, we extend the model with heterogeneity to allow for status concerns. We assume the 
following utility function: 
   , , , , , ,i i i i i i i i iU C g C C D D D E M D D D Z     , (27) 
where a bar denotes average in the population of the variable. Define the degree of positionality 
of good C and D for individual i as: 
 
1
i
i
i
i C C
C i
C C
g
g
 



 and 
i
i i
i
i D D
D i i
D D D
g
g g
 



, 
(28) 
and the degree of moral positionality as 
 
i
i i
i
i D D
i i
D D D
M
M M
 



. 
(29) 
As in the homogenous case we define: 
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1 i
i
i E
EC i
C C
g
MRS
g



, 
(30) 
as the conventional marginal rate of substitution for an individual between environmental 
quality and private consumption ceteris paribus, i.e. holding everything else in the model fixed, 
including the consumption of others. Furthermore, we define: 
 i i
EC ECMRS g , (31) 
as the marginal rate of substitution for an individual between environmental quality and private 
consumption when consumption is changed for all individuals in society. Correspondingly, 
define: 
 
1 i
i
i M
MC i
C C
g
MRS
g



and i i
MC MCMRS g . 
(32) 
We then have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 13. Consider a model with a heterogeneous population, with status concerns and 
initial behavioural bias, and where externalities can be taxed optimally. Then, 
i) The optimal level of a moral nudge (if it is positive), given optimal taxation of the 
dirty good, is given by 
 , ,
1 P Z
MC Z
D b D b
Z Z
CMRS Mq b
D D
 

   

 
ii) The optimal tax is given by 
,
,
1
1 1
1 1
P
MC D
D bPigouC
MC D
CMRS M
t t b CMRS M  

  

 


    
               
 
For the level of the nudge, the main difference from the homogenous case is the first part of the 
left-hand side of the condition. What determines the sign of this is the relative size of the two 
normalized covariance terms. The first, ,PD b , is the normalized covariance between the bias 
and the responsiveness to the price. If this normalized, covariance is positive it means that those 
that have a high initial bias are also more responsive to the price. The second, 
,ZD b
 , is the 
normalized covariance between the bias and the responsiveness to the nudge. If this normalized, 
covariance is positive it means that those that have a high initial bias are also more responsive 
to the nudge. Thus, similar to the case of a cognitive nudge, a moral nudge might be optimal to 
use even when an optimal tax can be used because it might better target individuals that have a 
biased perception of prices. 
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Finally, when the tax is not optimal, we have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 14 Consider a model with a heterogeneous population, with status concerns and 
initial behavioural bias, then, 
(i) The optimal level of a moral nudge when the dirty good cannot be taxed optimally 
is given by  
 
,
,
1
1
1
1
1
Z
MC D
D bPigouC MC Z
Z Z
MC D
CMRS M
CMRS Mq
t t b
D D
CMRS M  



 




 
      
 
  
        
 
(ii) The optimal tax on the dirty good for any level of the nudge is given by 
,
,
1
1 1
1 1
P
MC D
D bPigouC
MC D
CMRS M
t t b CMRS M  

  

 


    
               
 
 
7. Conclusions 
As far as we know, this is the first paper that has theoretically analyzed socially optimal levels 
of nudges in a prosocial context, such as dealing with environmental consequences, in a world 
where we to a varying extent could use a conventional Pigovian taxes to combat externalities. 
We find that under general settings, nudges would only play a limited role as long as optimal 
taxes can be implemented and the cost implementing a tax is lower than the cost of 
implementing a nudge. Moral nudges where people’s choices are affected by strengthening the 
consumers’ moral norms tend to maintain a larger role also when the consumption tax is optimal 
compared to purely cognitive nudges. By adding initial biases and internalities into our model 
we are able to incorporate important mechanisms from the existing theoretical nudging 
literature focussing on internalities with the prosocial nudging framework. Naturally, the 
optimal provision rules will then, in addition to the externality, also reflect the initial biases. 
We then show that relative concerns with respect to prosociality will also have important 
consequences for the social choice rule. The heterogeneous setting, finally, makes the model 
both more complex and realistic. In particular, this set of models points to cases where nudges 
would be optimal even when a first-best tax can be implemented. The reason why a nudge could 
be preferred is that it could better target individuals who for example suffers from an initial bias 
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than what a tax could do. More research is clearly needed, including dealing with non-
atmospheric externalities and a simultaneous redistributional perspective.  
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
The individual optimum condition implies that 
 
1DDC
C
u
MRS t Z P
u
     . 
(A1) 
The social optimum, where the externality is taken into account, implies that  
 '( )
1EDC
C
u E nD
MRS n
u
  . 
(A2) 
Combining the private and the social optimum conditions, (A1) and (A2), we have 
 '( )
1 1 1 '( )E EC
C
u E nD
t Z n nMRS E nD
u
      . 
(A3) 
It is clear that this expression is fulfilled with '( )Pigou ECt t nMRS E nD    and 0Z  . It would 
also be fulfilled with other combinations where 0Z  , but that would be associated with a 
resource cost to finance Z; hence, this could not be globally optimal.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
To obtain the optimal level of the nudge, we use Z as the only choice variable, for any given 
level of t. The first order condition for the social optimum is 
  ( ) '( ) 0C P D P E Pn u D q u D nu E nD D       . (A4) 
Substitute in the individual optimum condition (A1) in (A4) and solve for Z: 
 
'( ) PigouEC
P Z
q q
nMRS E nD t t t
D D
Z

 
   
   
(A5) 
To obtain the optimal level of the tax, we use the social first order condition with respect to the 
tax level: 
 '( ) 0P DC P EC PD MRS D nMRS E nD D    , (A6) 
and substitute in the individual optimal condition (A1) into (A6) and solve for t: 
 '( ) PigouECt Z nMRS E nD t Z      . (A7) 
Proposition 3 
The individual optimum condition implies that 
 1DC MC DMRS MRS M t   . (A8) 
The social optimum, where the externality is taken into account, implies that  
 '( )
1EDC MC D
C
u E nD
MRS MRS M n
u
   . 
(A9) 
Combining the private and the social optimum condition we have 
 '( )
'( ) PigouE EC
C
u E nD
t n nMRS E nD t
u
     . 
(A10) 
To obtain the optimal level of the nudge given a Pigovian we substitute the resource constraint 
into the utility function and look at the first order condition for the social optimum: 
  ( ) '( ) ( ) 0Z DC Z EC Z MC Z D Zn D q MRS D nMRS E nD D MRS M M D        (A11) 
Substitute the individual first order condition (A1) and the optimal tax expression (A10) into 
(A11): 
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0ZMC
Z Z
Mq
MRS
D D
   . 
 
This implies that: 
 
MC Zq MRS M . (A12) 
An interior solution is only possible for 0ZM  , otherwise 0Z  . 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
The first order condition for the socially optimal level of the nudge is given by (A11).  
Substituting the individual first order condition (A1) into (A11), we obtain 
 '( ) 0Z EC Z MC Zq tD nMRS E nD D MRS M     , (A13) 
implying that the condition for the optimal level of the nudge is, for Z > 0,  
 Pigou Z
MC
Z Z
Mq
t t MRS
D D
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(A14) 
The first order condition for an optimal tax, given any level of the nudge, is given by: 
 '( ) 0DC D P E P M D Ppn u D u D nu E nD D u M D
     
 
. 
(A15) 
Substituting the individual first order condition (A15) we obtain: 
 '( ) PigouECt nMRS E nD t   . (A16) 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Combining the private, 1DCMRS t b Z    , and social optimum conditions, 
'( ) 1DC ECMRS nMRS E nD  , we have: 
 1 1 '( )ECt b Z nMRS E nD     . (A15) 
It is clear that this condition is satisfied when:  
 '( ) PigouECt b nMRS E nD b t    , (A16) 
and 0Z  . It would also be satisfied with other combinations where 0Z  , but that would be 
associated with a resource cost to finance Z; hence, this could not be globally optimal. To find 
the level of the nudge when the tax is not optimal, substitute the resource constraint into the 
utility function and derive the first order condition: 
  ( ) '( ) 0P DC P EC Pn D q MRS D nMRS E nD D       . (A17) 
Substitute the individual first order condition, 1DCMRS b t Z    , and solve for Z: 
 
Pigou
Z
q
b t t
D
Z

  
 . 
(A18) 
The first order condition for an optimal tax given any level of the nudge is given by: 
 1 '( ) 0DC ECMRS nMRS E nD    . (A19) 
Substitute the individual first order condition, 1DCMRS b t Z    , and solve for t: 
 '( ) PigouECt nMRS E nD b Z t b Z        . (A20) 
 
Proposition 6 
Combining the individual optimum condition, 1DC MC DMRS MRS M t b    , and the social 
optimum condition, '( ) 1DC MC D MCMRS MRS M nMRS E nD   , we have: 
 '( ) PigouECt nMRS E nD b t b     . (A21) 
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To find the optimal level of a nudge when the tax is optimal, substitute the resource constraint 
into the utility function and derive the first order conditions: 
 ( ) '( ) ( ) 0Z DC Z EC Z MC Z D ZD q MRS D nMRS E nD D MRS M M D       . (A22) 
Substitute the individual first order condition, 1DC MC DMRS MRS M t b    , and the optimal 
tax in (A21) into the first order condition: 
  '( ) '( )
0
EC Z EC Z MC Z
MC Z
q b nMRS E nD b D nMRS E nD D MRS M
q MRS M
      
   
. 
(A23) 
An interior solution only possible for 0ZM  , otherwise 0Z  . The social first order condition 
for the nudge when the tax is not optimal is now: 
 ( ) '( ) ( ) 0Z DC Z EC Z MC Z D ZD q MRS D nMRS E nD D MRS M M D       . (A24) 
Substitute the individual first order condition, 1DC MC DMRS b t MRS M    , and rearrange: 
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
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(A25) 
The first order condition for an optimal tax given an existing level of the nudge is: 
 1 '( ) 0DC EC MC DMRS nMRS E nD MRS M     . (A26) 
Substitute the individual first order condition 1DC MC DMRS b t MRS M     and rearrange to 
obtain the optimal level of the tax: 
 '( ) PigouECt nMRS E nD b t b     . (A27) 
 
Proposition 7 
The individual optimum condition implies that: 
 1
1
1
DC MC DMRS CMRS M t
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
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
. 
(A28) 
The social optimum condition implies that:  
 '( ) 1DC MC D ECMRS CMRS M nCMRS E nD   . (A29) 
Combining these two and solve for the optimal tax t we have:  
 
'( )
1 1
PigouC
EC MC D MC Dt nCMRS E nD CMRS M t CMRS M
   
 
 
    
 
 
(A30) 
This can also be written as: 
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(A31) 
To find the optimal level of the nudge substitute the resource constraint into the utility function 
and derive the social first order condition: 
 ( ) '( ) ( ) 0Z DC Z EC Z MC Z D ZD q MRS D nCMRS E nD D CMRS M M D        (A32) 
 
Substitute the individual first order condition in (A28) and the optimal tax in (A30) and 
rearrange: 
 0MC Zq CMRS M    (A33) 
 
Interior solution only possible for 0ZM  , otherwise 0Z  .  
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Proposition 8 
Same socially optimal first order condition for the nudge as in (A32). The individual first order 
condition is now: 
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(A34) 
Substitute this into social first order condition and rearrange: 
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(A35) 
Then: 
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(A36) 
To find the optimal tax for a given level of the nudge, substitute the individual first order 
condition into social first order condition for a tax and solve for t: 
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Proposition 9 
Without loss of generality, we can write the individual budget constraint as: 
 i i i iC Y D qZ     . (A38) 
where 
1
0
n i
i


  and where in equilibrium i i itD qZ     , where i  is the individual 
lump-sum tax. Substitute the resource constraint in the social welfare function (23) using the 
utility function in (18): 
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(A39) 
The first order condition for the socially optimal level of the tax is: 
  
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This can also be written as: 
  
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  
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The individual first order condition implies that: 
 1i i iDCMRS t b Z    , (A42) 
Substitute this in (A41) and rearrange 
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P P Pj j i
t t D b D Z D
  
      . (A43) 
Rewrite this using normalized covariances: 
      , ,1 1 0D D Dp pPigou b D Dp p pt t n D nb D nZ D          (A44) 
Which means that the optimal tax is given by: 
    , ,1 1p pPigou b D Dt t b Z         (A45) 
Next derive the first order condition for the socially optimal level of the nudge: 
34 
 
  
1 1 1
0i
n n ni i i i i j j
P P E D PDi i j
Q D g D g E D 
  
         (A46) 
Or 
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Substitute the individual optimum condition in (A42) and rearrange 
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(A48) 
Use the short notation k k kN pD D  and normalized covariances and solve for Z: 
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(A49) 
This is the optimal level of the nudge for any given level of the tax. Substitute the optimal tax 
in (A49) and solve for Z: 
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(A51) 
Proposition 10 
Follows from 9 
 
Proposition 11 and 12 
The social optimum condition for the nudge implies that: 
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(A52) 
The individual perceived optimum condition implies that 
 1i i i iDC MC DMRS b t MRS M     (A53) 
Substitute (A52) in (A53): 
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Use short notations for the normalized covariances 
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(A55) 
Implying 
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n i
EC D Z Z b Di
MC Z MRS M
Q t MRS E nD nb D
nMRS M



     
 

 
(A56) 
So the condition for the optimal level of the nudge for a non-optimal level of the tax is: 
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 ,1 Z
Pigou MC Z
b D
Z Z
MRS Mq
t t b
D D
       
(A57) 
Next, take social first order conditions with respect to the tax: 
  
1 1 1
1
0
n n ni i i i j
P DC P EC D Pi i j
n i i i
MC D Pi
D MRS D MRS E D
MRS M D
  

  
 
  

 
(A58) 
Substitute the individual perceived optimum condition, 1i i i iDC MC DMRS b t MRS M    , and 
use short notation for normalized covariance and solve for the optimal tax: 
  ,1 pPigou b Dt t b     (A59) 
Substitute the optimal tax in (A59) into the expression for optimal level of nudge in (A57) and 
rearrange 
 
 , ,Z p MC Zb D b D
Z Z
MRS Mq
b
D D
      
(A60) 
 
Propositions 13 and 14 
Write the SWF as: 
 
  
1
, , , , , ,
n i i
i
i i i i i i i i i
W QN Y D
g Y Y D D D D D E M D D D Z

   
      

 
(A61) 
Take first order condition with respect to the nudge: 
 
 
1 1 1
1 1
1
1 1
0i k
n n ni i i i
Z DC Z Z DC Z EC Di i i
n ni i i i i i i i
MC Z D Z Z Z MCD D D Di i
Q nD MRS D D MRS nD MRS E
MRS M M D M D D MRS M

   
  
    
 
    
  
 
 
(A60) 
The private first order condition gives us: 
  
1
1
i
i
i i i
M D D Di i
DC i
C C
g M M
MRS b t
g



   

 
(A60) 
Substitute: 
 
1 1 1
1 1
1
1 1
0
1
i
n n ni i i i
Z Z Z Z EC Di i i
i
n ni i i i
MC Z Z MCi Di i
Q tnD b D D B nD CMRS E
CMRS M D CMRS M

 
 

  
 
    
 

  

  
 
 
(A60) 
 
Use the short notation , cov ,MC Z
MC Z
MRS M
MC Z
MRS M
MRS M

 
  
 
  and , cov ,Z
Z
b D
Z
Db
b D

 
  
 
: 
 
,
1
,
1
1
1 1
1 0
1
N
MC D
Pigou
nD b i i
Z Z Z MC Zi
Z MC D
CMRS M
t
Q tnD nD b nD CMRS M
nD CMRS M  


 
 





 
      
  
  
         

 
(A60) 
Rearranging we can express the condition for the optimal level of the nudge as: 
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,
,
1
1
1
1
1
N
MC D
D bPigouC MC Z
Z Z
MC D
CMRS M
CMRS Mq
t t b
D D
CMRS M  



 




 
       
 
  
       
 
(A60) 
Consider next the optimal tax, and take the first order condition w.r.t. the tax: 
 
 
1 1
1 1
1
1
1 1
0
D
i
k
n ni i i
P DC P DCpi i
n ni i i i i i
Z EC D MC D P PD Di i
n i i
P MC D Di
nD MRS D D MRS
nD MRS E MRS M D M D
D MRS M

  
 

  
 
  
 
 
 

 
(A60) 
Write the individual first order condition as: 
  
 
1
1
1 (1 )
i
i
i
i i i
M D D Di i
DC i
C C
i i i i
M D D D
g M M
MRS b t
g
b t g M M




   

     
 
(A60) 
Substitute and rearrange 
 
,
1
1
1 1
0
1
P
i
Pigou
D b
P P P
i
n i i
P MCi Di
t
nD t nD nD b
D CMRS M

 
 

 
    
  




 
(A60) 
Solving for the tax we have 
 
,
,
1
1 1
1 1
P
MC D
D bPigouC
MC D
CMRS M
t t b CMRS M  

  

 


    
               
 
(A60) 
Subsitute the tax expression in the condition for the optimal level of the nudge and rearrange: 
 
 , ,
1 P Z
MC Z
D b D b
Z Z
CMRS Mq b
D D
 

   

 
(A60) 
 
